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PREFACE 
This research examines investor reaction to the events 
leading to the passage of FIRREA in 1989. Intervention 
analysis is used within the context of the market model to 
determine the impact of this legislation on depository 
institution performance and risk. Data for depository 
institutions was gathered and segmented into three 
equally-weighted regulatory portfolio's. Stigler's (1971) 
hypothesis of regulation according benefits in a 
disproportionate manner is investigated. Peltzman's (1976) 
hypothesis of increased ownership risk resulting from a 
change in the regulatory environment is also examined. 
A project of this scope would be completely impossible 
without the help and guidance of a great many people. I 
would like to express my personal gratitude to the members of 
my committee for their patience and understanding. Dr. Joe 
Jadlow for his guidance, encouragement and editorial 
comments. Dr. Tim Krehbiel for his counselling of the 
econometric work and the foresight to allow a mainframe 
novice to hopefully mature into a more sophisticated user. 
Dr. Don Bumpass for his tremendous advice and counsel in 
maintaining my focus throughout this procedure. Dr. Gerald 
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M. Lage for his patience with my academic career which has 
spanned a well-documented and somewhat lengthy era. 
Via the data collection phase, I was most appreciative 
of my former employer, the Economics Department of the 
University of Arkansas, for allowing me the opportunity to 
access the majority of the data necessary for this research. 
Special thanks to Dr. Joe Ziegler, Chairman, and Dr. Don 
Market of the Bureau of Business and Economic Research. 
Helpful comments from Dr. Mike Benefield, Dr. Jim Rimby and 
the ever present enthusiasm of one Dr. Charles "Chuck" 
Britton were especially welcome. 
Along the way I became eminently.involved and learned in 
mainframe computer communications which included TSO, CMS, 
VMS, and the ability to telnet substantial amounts of data 
from the university of Arkansas to Oklahoma State University. 
Special thanks to Renee Lewin for her CMS and tape technology 
skills, Betty Gilliam with her knowledge of TSO and Loraine 
Goff for her Fortran and JCL expertise. The relentless 
hospitality of Cindy Williams of the osu computer staff along 
with Kathy Lawter, Tom Buttress and Dan Charlile made this 
journey easier. The computer services and communications 
personnel of the University of Arkansas rendered invaluable 
service, foremost among these are Ken Schrinner and Bill 
Ashmore. 
Without the infinite patience of a very special person 
the empirical work of this research would have been a much 
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more formidable task if not completely impossible. The 
genius which is Iris MacPherson will always be remembered by 
this author with a special admiration. 
A very special thanks to Brad Livingstone who provided 
inspiration and hope to me on some very tough days. I would 
like to express gratitude to Dr. Ron Moomaw and Dr. Mike 
Applegate for making my completion of the requirements for 
the Ph.D. possible. A note of gratitude to Donna Woodward of 
the statistical staff of SAS for her Proc Syslin prowess. 
A heartfelt thanks to my mother, father, brother and 
mynieces Marie and Liz and nephew Dewey and the remaining 
part of my family for their confidence and help in the 
fulfillment of a dream. Thanks to my Aunt Florida and Aunt 
Lottie for their constant enthusiasm with my educational 
development. To my Sigma Theta Kappa brothers, there simply 
aren't any words to express the importance of your 
encouragement throughout this process. A finer set of 
brothers nobody could hope to find. Particular expressions 
of thanks to "Evil", Sib, Murt, Cliff and Hootus who have 
always been there when needed most. Thanks to Schootalaukis 
as well. 
Perhaps the age of miracles has yet to cease as 
witnessed by the completion of this research. 
This dissertation is dedicated to the everlasting memory 
of sarah Irene Dudley 4/4/87 a most beloved and missed 
friend. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The 1980s will long be remembered as one of the most 
chaotic decades in the history of the depository institutions 
industry. The record number of insolvencies and failures 
witnessed have threatened the viability of the industry and 
has led to the extinction of at least one of the insurance 
entities established to assure depositor confidence, namely 
the Federal savings and Loan Insurance corporation (FSLIC}. 
The extent of the crisis stretches memories back to the 
banking holocaust of the Great Depression and has forced 
itself to the very forefront of the political agenda as the 
largest bailout in the nation's history has been approved. 
An attempt to mitigate these consequences came with the 
enactment of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and 
Enforcement Act (FIRREA} of 1989 which altered the 
competitive positions and regulatory environment of the 
industry. Specifically designed to restructure the industry 
and curb abuses attributed to deregulation earlier in the 
decade, the main purposes of the act were fourfold. First, 
the recapitalization of both the industry and the unified 
insurance fund under control of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
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Corporation (FDIC). Second, the lowering of risk exposure of 
the savings and loan component, particularly the 
state-chartered thrifts which represent the greatest 
percentage of losses within the industry. Third, the 
elimination of permissive regulatory attitudes in order to 
reduce the potential for mismanagement, fraud and malfeasance 
of funds fostered by a lax regulatory environment. Fourth, 
to re-institute the public's trust by disposing of 
institutions currently insolvent or heading towards failure. 
Stigler (1971) envisions a market for regulation whereby 
suppliers and demanders of regulation allocate regulation via 
a bidding process. Those possessing the most effective 
demand, as determined by political influence, receive the 
greatest benefits of the regulatory offer. Furthermore, when 
an industry is not regulated homogeneously, as is the case of 
the depository institutions industry, such rewards for 
effective bidding can be profound. Therefore to analyze the 
impact of regulatory change, an industry cannot be lumped 
together but rather must be segmented along various 
regulatory lines (James 1983). 
Schwert (1981} asserts that the usage of financial 
theory to assess the impact of regulatory changes is proper 
and conveys a distinct advantage that traditional welfare 
oriented economic theory cannot employ. An important tenant 
of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) states that the 
announcement of any unexpected significant information 
affecting a financial entity is immediately evaluated and 
translated into its asset prices by the market participants. 
Therefore, any announcement containing important regulatory 
change will have discernible effects and will allow the 
testing of Stigler's (1971) hypothesis that wealth is 
redistributed among the various segments of an industry. 
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The focus of this research will be to examine the 
influence of FIRREA on 1) the performance of the various 
segments of the depository institutions industry, 2} the 
question of whether the legislation conveyed advantages to 
certain members while precluding or coming at the expense of 
others, i.e. Stigler's (1971} hypothesis of wealth 
redistribution will be investigated, and 3) Peltzman's (1976} 
contention that regulatory change may alter ownership risk of 
shareholders. 
Using capital market data and employing the market 
model, the industry will be segmented into three regulatory 
portfolio's. These will be comprised of 1} commercial banks, 
2} state-chartered savings and loans and 3) federally 
chartered savings and loans. Theil's (1971) Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression (SUR) framework will be used to 
incorporate contemporaneous correlation within the industry 
to account for joint reactions of changes. Intervention 
analysis will be used to ascertain the influence of the 
events leading to the passage of FIRREA· on the risk 
characteristics of these portfolio's. 
The remainder of this proposal is organized as follows: 
Chapter II describes the historical background leading to the 
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passage of FIRREA. A discussion of the tenets of the 
legislation will also be included. Chapter III will examine 
the previous empirical studies of the impact of regulatory 
change on depository institutions. Chapter IV introduces the 
data collection process and methodology employed. Chapter V 
contains the hypotheses to be tested and the appropriate test 
statistics. Chapter VI presents the interpretation of the 
results, conclusions and recommendations for the extension of 
this research and closely related topics. 
CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND HISTORY 
Introduction 
Fundamental and dramatic changes in the economic and 
competitive environments which the depository institutions 
industry encountered during the 1970s and 1980s led to changes 
in the regulatory philosophy governing the industry. FIRREA 
is the latest and most important in a series of legislative 
regulatory responses to the changing nature of the financial 
services industry. Competitive restrictions imposed by 
legislation of the 1930s left depository institutions at a 
competitive disadvantage relative to alternative competitors 
and investment vehicles in the 1970s. 
This section will document the difficulties faced by the 
depository institutions industry and the resulting Federal 
Government's legislative responses in the 1980s. In order to 
obtain a clearer perspective of the ultimate impact of the 
FIRREA upon the various components of the industry, a brief 
examination of the phenomena which are popularly credited 
with leading to it's conception and subsequent passage can be 
instructional. 
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The Economic Environment of the 1970s 
The initial catalyst of change for the then sedate 
depository industry arose in the mid-1970s. High and 
volatile rates of inflation put upward pressure on interest 
rates. Restricted by Regulation Q to maximum rates which 
could be paid to attract deposits, depository institutions 
began to experience disintermediation on a historical scale 
as rational investors pursued alternative repositories 
offering non-regulated market oriented rates of return for 
their liquid funds (Balderston 1984). 
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This shrinking depositor base was a particularly acute 
problem for the thrift component of the industry given its 
unique maturity structure of lending long-term, primarily for 
home mortgages while relying heavily on shorter-term deposits 
for their necessary reserves. Meier (1985) points out that 
such disintermediation meant thrifts would be forced to seek 
sources of financing via the money markets with non-regulated 
rates in order to service their fixed-rate mortgage loan 
obligations. The rates of return on their long-term 
mortgages were far lower than the new higher money market 
rates driving down their profitability as they competed for 
funds during the latter 1970s (Bowden and Holbert 1984). 
The Federal Reserve's dedication to decreasing 
inflationary pressure by abandoning short-term interest rate 
targets in favor of monetary growth limits in October of 1979 
exasperated the situation for thrifts (Pilzer 1989). The 
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ensuing restrictive monetary policies pursed after this time 
period would prove to increase interest rates to double digit 
levels as conveyed by the Fed increasing the discount rate to 
a then record of 12 percent (Pilzer 1989). such an 
unprecedented inflationary era further enhanced the desire to 
elude the profit eroding effects of constrictive regulation 
and indeed accelerated the process both from within and 
outside of the industry proper. 
Financial Innovation 
Bound by restrictions and regulations, it was evident by 
the late 1970s that the depository institutions industry 
could no longer adequately fulfill the return requirements of 
their customers given their current array of deposit 
offerings. Incentives for financial innovation existed and 
were manifested by new investment instruments paying market 
determined and inflation hedging rates of return (Meier 1985). 
Money Market Mutual Funds (MMMFs) provided the initial 
source of major interindustry competition to depository 
institutions. MMMFs which had only limited appeal and 
popularity upon their inception during the lower inflationary 
era of the early 1970s, quickly became an ever important 
component in the portfolios of sophisticated bearers of funds 
attempting to offset the effects of spiraling inflation by 
the end of the decade. They were short-term investments 
primarily tied to Treasury Department debt obligations in the 
money market. Depositors found MMMFs to be acceptable 
substitutes for their traditional transaction and time 
deposits held in depository institutions despite their lack 
of both interest rate guarantees and federal insurance 
protection (Jaffee 1989). This absence of federal insurance 
made these investments subject to increased default risk 
relative to ordinary deposits (Cargill 1991). However, 
depositors demonstrated their willingness to accept this 
increased risk in order to have the opportunity to garner 
competitive returns. In 1972 MMMFs' asset holdings totaled 
less than $2 billion and grew to $10.8 billion by 1978 which 
came largely from withdrawals at depository institutions 
(Benston 1986). 
8 
Investors gained further access to money market rates 
while enjoying checking account privileges with the creation 
of Merrill Lynch's Cash Management Account (CMA) in 1977. A 
CMA could be opened for a minimum deposit of $20,000 which 
allowed a client to originate checks on the loan value of his 
investments. cash advances could also be obtained with the 
individuals VISA card while the balance within the account 
received the going money market rate (Meier 1985). 
These alternative investment opportunities shared 
several unique features. First, they gave their investors 
more liberal transaction account features with returns in 
excess of depository rates of interest. They also penetrated 
and further eroded the deposit base of the nation's 
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depository industry. 
These alternatives were feasible due to the improvements 
and adoption of advanced computer and telecommunications 
technology. This technological advance allowed the rapid and 
reliable transference of funds necessary for this type of 
activity to be profitable. The traditional paper-bound 
depository industry was ill-prepared for this revolution and 
initially failed to meet the resulting competitive challenge 
(Kane 1981) . 
The deteriorating nature of the balance sheets of 
depository institutions was not exclusively confined to the 
liability side. Commercial enterprises began offering their 
own debt for auction in ever increasing quantities (Kaufman, 
Mote, and Rosenblum 1982). This direct placement of debt by 
major corporations decreased the size of the lending 
portfolios of depository institutions. cargill (1991) points 
out that the volume of commercial paper issued rose 600 
percent from 1978 to 1988 while traditional borrowing at 
banks increased by less than half of this figure. 
Limited Service Banks (Nonbank Banks) 
For the purpose of regulation the Bank Holding Company 
' Act of 1956 defined a bank as any entity which both accepts 
deposits and makes commercial loans. Any institution meeting 
such criteria is subject to the regulatory apparatus at the 
federal and or local levels. An entity not performing both 
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functions simultaneously would not be classified as a bank. 
such a limitation of operations allows these "limited service 
banks" to successfully elude the more stringeni regulations 
of reserve requirements and deposit insurance. 
This nonbank bank loophole conveys a competitive 
advantage to such institutions. Nonbank banks were able to 
provide a greater diversity of products to depositors during 
a period when they desired just such items. By filling a 
void in the market with market oriented financial instruments 
nonbank banks became significant competitors to depository 
.institutions and thereby contributed to disintermediation. 
Bank holding companies employed the nonbank bank loophole to 
great advantage for the interstate marketing of their 
services while credit cards were made available nationwide by 
various nonfinancial companies (Rosenblum and Siegel 1983). 
Depository institutions faced challenge's from a diverse 
field of these new competitors. Included among these nonbank 
banks were the financial subsidiaries of some of the nations 
leading manufactures and retailers such as the General 
Electric credit Corporation, sears and Roebuck, Ford, ITT and 
the General Motors Acceptance corporation. These firms 
offered a variety of financial services ranging from equity 
securities to home mortgages (Haraf 1988). 
Intraindustry Innovation 
Witnessing ever declining liquidity and profit 
positions, depository institutions had incentives of their 
own for financial innovation. Faced with an eroding 
depositor base and the migration of corporate borrowing, 
institutions had two goals: 1) to encourage depositor 
retention and 2) broaden the scope and nature of their loan 
portfolios. 
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In order to accomplish the first goal, institutions 
pursued methods of diversifying their deposit offerings while 
paying money market rates and eluding the strict regulatory 
codes forbidding such behavior (Cargill and Garcia 1982). A 
successful strategy of shifting to less regulated deposit 
venues could help improve their liquidity positions. 
State-chartered thrift institutions in New England were the 
first to venture into this arena (Kane 1981). Taking 
advantage of more liberal state regulatory attitudes, S&Ls in 
this region began to offer Negotiable orders of Withdrawal 
(NOW Accounts). Although still relegated to a ceiling 
interest rate, these accounts permitted checks to be written 
on time deposits which had the effect of making such deposits 
transactions accounts (Cargill and Garcia 1985). In 1978 
temporary authority was given to New York and New Jersey to 
experiment with NOW Accounts (Woerheide 1984). This 
innovation allowed S&Ls in the Northeast to effectively pay 
greater interest on these pseudo transaction accounts than 
what commercial banks were permitted. These NOW Accounts 
extended beyond the direct control and influence of the Fed 
12 
(Cargill and Garcia 1985). 
However, NOW Accounts had very limited availability 
nationwide. In the presence of such a migration of funds 
thrifts had several alternatives to meet their short-run 
liquidity needs. They could sell off portions of their 
mortgage holdings thus downsizing operations, but this would 
limit their revenue generating capabilities. Many 
institutions sought advances from the Federal Home Loan Bank 
Board (FHLBB) where members could obtain funds at favorable 
rates. FHLBB advances totaled $6 billion in 1966 and grew to 
$40 billion by 1980. Institutions could also bid for funds 
in the money market and pay the current rate of interest. 
During periods of inflation this avenue would drive up the 
cost of funds (U.S. Department of the Treasury, June 30, 
1980). 
In 1978 the FHLBB took the first step toward interest 
rate deregulation for thrifts by approving the issuance of 
Money Market Certificates (MMCs), (U.S. savings and Loan 
League 1980). The purpose of such certificates was to aid 
thrifts by creating an instrument which could effectively 
compete with MMMFs thereby lessening the disintermediation 
effects of Regulation Q (Carron 1982). Their primary appeal 
was a rate of return which was set at 25 basis points above 
the six month Treasury Bill rate. Designed to be within 
reach of the middle class, these six month certificates could 
be obtained for a minimum of $10,000. MMCs proved to be a 
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very popular form of deposit accounting for 40.4 percent of 
total thrift deposits in 1981 replacing traditional passbook 
and fixed-rate certificates as thrifts prime source of funds 
(Woerheide 1984). This would increase the cost of funds and 
also expose thrifts to a higher level of interest rate risk, 
hence they would aid liquidity needs but increase the 
probability of decreasing profits (Carron 1982}. MMCs did 
move the industry towards the adoption of a greater volume of 
nonborrowed reserves (Cargill and Garcia 1985). 
An attempt to retain the deposits of large institutional 
investors led regulators to abolish interest rate ceilings on 
Jumbo CDs offered by depository institutions in 1973 
(Woerheide 1984). In existence since the 1960s these 
certificates with minimum denominations of $100,000 became 
more popular at the end of the 1970s when higher rates of 
inflation were experienced. Approximately half of S&L 
deposits took this form by late 1980 (Federal Reserve Bank of 
Chicago 1987). Jumbo CDs carried lower reserve requirements 
than normal deposits which would be an advantage to 
depository institutions (Cargill and Garcia 1985). Unlike 
MMMFs these Jumbo CDs were covered by Federal insurance which 
would make them palatable to larger investors (Carron 1982}. 
The elimination of interest rate ceilings on these 
certificates was the first effort made to allow institutions 
to compete for funds with the MMMFs. However their rather 
large minimum requirements made them a feasible alternative 
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to only the largest customers while the lack of interest rate 
ceilings would most certainly increase the cost of funds to 
depository institutions extending these offerings. 
Repurchase agreements (RPs) were another liquidity 
enhancing innovation. Although they were available prior to 
the disintermediation troubles of depository institutions, 
RPs became ever more popular during the late 1970s (Cargill 
and Garcia 1985). Essentially banks sell securities, 
generally u.s. Treasury debt obligations, to their larger 
transaction depositors who may temporarily have balances 
exceeding their immediate needs. By nature these monies 
therefore draw a lower amount of interest than Treasury 
securities. In purchasing these securities the client 
receives a greater return for his total balances than without 
the transaction when the bank repurchases the securities at a 
later date, usually overnight, for a pre-agreed guaranteed 
price (Jaffee 1989). 
RPs allow the bank to obtain non-borrowed reserves to 
expand its lending capabilities while helping to retain its 
larger clients (Cargill and Garcia 1985). These funds are 
not subject to reserve requirements but are not insured by 
the federal authorities. Their short-term nature and higher 
interest is appealing to the customer. 
The Federal Reserve permitted commercial banks to open 
Automatic Transfer service (ATS) Accounts in 1978 to 
encourage their retention of savers (Burns 1988). 
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Essentially ATS Accounts allowed banks to use interest 
bearing savings deposits as transaction accounts via the 
instantaneous transfer of funds whenever the checking account 
balance of the client drops below a pre-specified lever 
(Woerheide 1984). The net effect of ATS Accounts was to make 
savings deposits at commercial banks more "checkable" 
(Cargill 1991). 
Unfortunately, the second goal of asset diversification 
was not so readily accomplished. Restrictions on asset 
composition with fixed rates of return greatly inhibited 
depository institutions from generating sufficient revenues 
to cover their increasing costs of acquiring funds. 
Institution assets would have to take on similar 
characteristics to the new short term liabilities, i.e. 
shorter maturities and inflation adjusted rates of return. 
The primary innovation on this front came from 
state-chartered thrifts. 
Variable Rate Mortgages 
Variable Rate Mortgages (VRMs) are mortgage loans whose 
rate corresponds to current market rates of interest and were 
employed by institutions as compensation for inflation. 
california thrifts were the initial providers of such loans 
as early as 1975 {Carron 1982). However they were slow to 
catch on due to the public's inflationary expectations and 
the current level of interest rates. Part of the advantage 
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of institutions use of VRMs was offset by generally placing 
the initial interest rate below the fixed mortgage rate in 
order to gain wider public acceptance. Caps on the allowable 
increases in interest rates would also deter adequate 
compensation in a rapidly spiraling inflationary environment. 
By late 1981 less than 2 percent of all outstanding mortgage 
loans of thrifts were of this type. VRMs became more widely 
accepted during the lower inflationary period to follow and 
by January 1984 60 percent of mortgage loans took this form 
(Cargill and Garcia 1985). 
Thrifts were facing a delima since their deposits were 
rapidly being converted to the new .higher returning 
instruments while the majority of mortgages remained pent up 
at lower fixed rates. Revenues could only increase on the 
new higher rate mortgages. Therefore the cost of maintaining 
a portfolio of savings deposits was escalating faster than 
the revenue generated off mortgage lending. The resulting 
decreased profits gave many of these institutions a greater 
incentive to take on increased risk lending opportunities in 
an effort to match their earning yields closer to their costs 
of funds (Cargill and Garcia 1985). 
Regulation 
Regulation itself imposes costs upon depository 
institutions in three primary forms: 1) capital requirements/ 
2) deposit insurance and 3) activity restrictions (Rose and 
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Rose 1979). Institutions with a choice among alternatives 
started to withdraw from the Federal Reserve system in favor 
of becoming regulated by less stringent state authorities. 
Voluntary Fed membership had decreased enough for its control 
over total bank deposits to diminish from 80 percent in 1970 
to 71 percent by 1979 (Cargill and Garcia 1985). The Fed's 
influence over monetary aggregates began to wain. 
Regulation of depository institutions ~as clearly at a 
crossroads in 1980. One option would be to expand its 
influence to encompass the new competitors and products. The 
question of how to cope with future innovations could not 
however be adequately addressed with this course of action. 
Deregulation of depository institution asset and liability 
structures in order to enhance greater competition throughout 
the financial services industry was a second option. 
Authorities opted for the latter by passing a series of new 
regulatory legislation which would liberalize the asset and 
liability compositions of depository institutions while 
reinstating the Fed's autonomy over monetary aggregates. 
DIDMCA 
March 1980 witnessed the enactment of the Depository 
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary control Act (DIDMCA) 
which had two fundamental purposes. The first of which was 
to enhance the competitive positions of depository 
institutions by liberalizing their asset and liability 
structures. The second objective was to reestablish the 
Fed's influence over monetary aggregates by extending its 
control to include the reserves of all depository 
institutions whether they had previously been members of the 
system or not (Spong 1990). 
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New homogeneous reserve requirements were instituted to 
permit the Fed to regain its control over the money supply 
while promoting a more competitive environment within the 
industry. DIDMCA would also advance greater inter and intra 
industry competition by recognizing the new products spawned 
by the industry's innovative efforts. ATS accounts received 
authorization and NOW Accounts were extended nationwide 
(Burns 1988). The act provided for the eventual phase out of 
Regulation Q over the insuing six years (Burns 1988). The 
lack of diversified asset portfolios was recognized for which 
S&Ls were granted more discretionary use of non-mortgage 
investment and lending instruments (Cooper and Fraser 1984). 
Thrifts could distribute 20 percent of their assets among 
various consumer purposes, commercial paper or other forms of 
corporate debt issues (Spong 1990). Thrifts were now 
permitted to issue credit cards. 
DIDMCA also provided equal and full access for all 
institutions to the entire range of Fed services which would 
now be priced. This included the extension of discount 
window privileges to every institution. Federal deposit 
insurance protection was now raised to $100,000 per account 
in order to bolster the depositing publics confidence in the 
financial system (Burns 1988). 
DIDMCA was hailed as the single most influential 
alteration of the regulatory environment of the industry to 
date since the bulk of legislation regulating the industry 
was passed during the 1930s. The relaxation of artificial 
restraints on their lines of commerce was felt to be 
advantageous to depository institutions. 
Despite this outlook, significant problems remained for 
the various components of the industry. Homogeneous reserve 
requirements promote a fairer degree of competition within 
the industry but still impart a competitive advantage to 
non-regulated entities such as MMMFs and nonbank banks which 
can successfully elude such restrictions (Cargill and Garcia 
1985). 
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The attempt to reduce the duration of asset maturity to 
more closely reflect the shorter term liability side for 
thrifts remained an unsolved problem. Many thrifts had 
already committed vast portions of their reserves to mortgage 
obligations which left them without the ability to take full 
advantage of the new instruments. This process would take 
several years to reach a fuller fruition. Short-run hopes of 
dramatically increased thrift profitability were in vain 
(Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 1987). 
Persistent high interest rates in excess of those levels 
experienced during the latter 1970s raised the cost of 
acquired funds to thrifts while still encouraging 
disintermediation. Thrift access· to funds continued to 
diminish as MMMFs had the most dramatic growth rate ever of 
150 percent between 1980 and 1982 (Balderston 1984). An 
adequate and elastic source of funds for housing became less 
tenable and it was clear that the thrift component of the 
industry would require further assistance to remain viable 
(Carron 1982). 
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The Federal Government made an effort to subsidize the 
increasing cost of acquiring funds by creating tax-exempt 
savings certificates (Carron 1982). All-savers Certificates 
were established by the Economic Recovery and Tax Act of 
1981. These were one year certificates on which institutions 
paid only 70 percent of the current one year Treasury rate. 
However, the tax free return on All-Savers certificates 
exceeded the passbook rate (Carron 1982). They proved to be 
short-lived as Congressional concerns over decreasing tax 
revenues grew and they were allowed to lapse. Universal 
IRA's were also instituted by this legislation to increase 
the level of deposits (Woerheide 1984). 
Garn-st. Germain 
The Depository Institutions Act, better known as the 
Garn-st. Germain Act, was signed into law on December 12, 
1982. The essential purpose of the legislation was to 
further broaden thrift powers in order to mitigate their 
interest rate risk (Gart 1985). Policy makers believed that 
by permitting a greater range of thrift asset and liability 
holdings while granting all institutions the opportunity to 
offer new money market instruments that thrifts could remain 
viable (Cargill and Garcia 1985). 
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Liability diversification was achieved with the 
inauguration of two new pseudo money market accounts. Money 
Market Deposit Accounts (MMDAs) with minimum deposits of 
$2,500 were created in December 1982 and were specifically 
designed to stem disintermediation by effectively competing 
on equal terms with MMMFs. The interest rate paid on these 
accounts was to be freely determined by the originating 
institution. While such competition would clearly increase 
the costs of funds in a high interest rate environment, this 
effect would be partially offset by the decision to excuse 
institutions issuing personal MMDAs from holding required 
reserves against these non-maturing balances (Gart 1984). 
MMDAs also carried federal deposit insurance guarantees, an 
added benefit over MMMFs. These accounts proved to be 
emensely popular as holdings of MMDAs grew to $340 billion in 
their first three months of issuance (Meier 1985). 
Super NOW Accounts (SNOWs) were introduced in January 
1983 as a result of Garn-st. Germain. SNOWs were NOW 
Accounts but lacked their subjugation to Regulation Q. They 
totaled $30 billion within their first six months (Cooper and 
Fraser 1984). SNOWs permitted institutions to offer 
unregulated rates on what are essentially transaction 
accounts. 
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Even though a tenet of Garn-st. Germain accelerated the 
termination date of Regulation Q to January 1984, the point 
was mute since MMDAs and SNOWs effectively eliminated 
interest ceilings of transaction balances. They also proved 
successful in arresting the disintermediation difficulties of 
thrifts as MMMFs actually declined in volume after MMDAs and 
SNOWs came on line (Cargill 1991). 
Under Garn-st. Germain federally-chartered thrifts could 
now originate transaction accounts to individuals or 
commercial enterprises which had previously established a 
working relationship with the thrift (Cargill 1991). Thrifts 
were now permitted to provide overdraft loans (Meier 1985) In 
order to accommodate the revenue requirements resulting from 
the increasing cost of funds, this act took steps to 
diversify the loan portfolios of thrifts by permitting 
increased non-mortgage lending limits. Five percent of total 
assets could now be channeled into corporate loans. Under 
this act thrifts had the opportunity to issue 40 percent of 
their assets as nonresidential real estate loans with another 
30 percent for consumer loans. Thrifts could issue 10 
percent of their assets in the form of tangible personal 
property loans and 5 percent in support of the educational 
needs of individuals (Burns 1988). With Garn-st. Germain's 
enactment, federal thrifts were given permission to increase 
---------
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both the loan limit to a single borrower and the amount of 
reals estate loans they could originate (Gart 1985). These 
lending opportunities were new and untried ventures for 
thrifts. Thrifts were also given the option to purchase 
government debt obligations with the entirety of their assets 
(Meier 1985). Despite these newly acquired powers, policy 
makers still envisioned the primary mission of thrifts as 
being the essential contributor to home ownership at 
favorable rates (Gart 1985). 
Continued Problems for Thrifts 
several problems arose as a result of broadening the 
activities of thrifts in a high interest rate environment. 
The deregulatory philosophy of the Reagan administration 
brought less supervisory and auditing control of institutions 
which set the stage for possible abuses (Pilzer 1989). 
The new assets carried more risk than the carefully 
screened mortgage loans traditionally handled by thrifts. 
They also plunged thrifts into new competitive arenas and 
products for which they had little prior expertise at best 
(Pilzer 1989). Thrifts could now extend speculative real 
estate loans, make equity purchases and become involved in 
interest futures contracts and junk bond transactions (Pilzer 
1989). What had constituted unacceptable risks in prior 
eras almost became required investments as the cost of funds 
rose steadily and dramatically. Thrifts were becoming 
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increasingly involved with direct investments in residential 
and commercial enterprise building endeavors as well as land 
development (Benston 1985). The singular nature of these 
projects lay in the fact of thrifts actually owning and or 
managing these assets directly which had heretofore been 
unprecedented. In twenty states, state-chartered thrifts had 
the opportunity to also hold equity securities which were 
forbidden to their federally-chartered counterparts (Benston 
1985) . 
Reductions in the net worth requirement of thrifts 
coupled with a high loan origination fee of 6 percent also 
created the opportunity for direct speculation in thrift 
ownership. Pilzer (1989) gives an example of how one could 
start a S&L for $3 million under the relatively liberal 
state-chartering requirements. This capital could legally 
attract as much as $100 million which could then be lent to 
speculative real estate developers. The 6 percent 
origination fee would not only recover the initial capital 
outlay but would also generate an additional $3 million in 
profit even without considering the rate of return on the 
loan. In the event of the loan defaulting, the government 
would be chiefly responsible for the protection of depositors 
via federal insurance guarantees. This situation creates a 
moral hazard problem particularly since very risky adventures 
could be conducted with the flat rate deposit insurance fee. 
Deposit insurance is mis-priced since it is myopic to the 
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nature and magnitude of risk which the institutions encounter 
with their loan portfolios. Thus the insurance in effect 
acts as a direct subsidy for risk taking (Cooper and Fraser 
1984}. 
state-chartered thrifts did in fact take advantage of 
less restrictive local oversight than their 
federally-chartered counterparts. Pilzer (1989) points out 
that California state-chartered thrifts had the ability to 
legally invest their entire asset portfolios into any 
investment of their choosing without regard to risk. By 
using a subsidiary of itself, a thrift could conceivably 
invest all of its reserves in junk bonds. Pilzer (1989) 
cites a further concern of eliminating the 5 percent 
ceiling on $100,000 brokered deposits by nonbank banks. 
S&Ls, most notably in Texas and California, offered very high 
returns on such deposits which carried federal deposit 
insurance protection. This increase in cost to attract funds 
could then only be recaptured by originating investments with 
greater amounts of risk. 
Recession 
Just as the industry was adopting a wider range of 
deposits and nonborrowed reserves which were increasing their 
costs of operations while making riskier investments with 
greater chances for failure, another severe economic shock 
hit the U.S. economy. During the early 1980s the economy 
suffered its worst recession since the era of the Great 
Depression. Significant spikes in key industries which have 
traditionally sought major sources of their financing from 
depository institutions were particularly devastating in 
local regions of the country. Depressed prices in the 
agriculture, petroleum and housing industries left many 
institutions, especially thrifts, with an ever expanding 
volume of nonperforming loans and defaults (Haraf 1988). 
As the recession intensified many of the high risk 
ventures in real estate development fell through. 
Institutions witnessed loan loss provisions rising while 
profits evaporated and indeed became negative in 1981 and 
1982 (Benston 1985). The resulting deterioration of asset 
quality put a tremendous strain on FSLIC reserves and to a 
lesser extent the FDIC fund (Benston 1985). 
The Competitive Equality Banking Act 
In an attempt to replenish the FSLIC fund and avert an 
impending catastrophe which such an occurrence would render, 
congress passed the Competitive Equality Banking Act (CEBA) 
in 1987. The principle component of the legislation was to 
extract $10.8 billion from the thrift component of the 
industry in order to resuscitate the FSLIC insurance fund 
(Cargill 1991). So massive was the crisis in reality that 
this figure represented only a down payment on the amount 
which would eventually be required to protect depositors. 
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S&Ls continued to fail in record numbers forcing the ultimate 
liquidation of the FSLIC fund (Banking Report March 9, 
1986,p22). This act encompassed nonbank banks into the 
regulatory process. For regulatory purposes it redefined a 
bank as an entity offering FDIC insured accounts as well as 
non-FDIC insured enterprises issuing transaction accounts and 
extending commercial loans. Nonbank banks in existence prior 
to 1987 were "grandfathered" by the new legislation but faced 
expansion restrictions. The number of nonbank banks was 
placed at 157 in 1987 (Haraf 1988). In addition, the CEBA 
extended regulatory forbearance of net worth requirements to 
thrifts whose difficulties were a direct result of the 
economic downturn (Haraf 1988) This situation was most 
prevalent among thrifts in Texas (Cargill 1991). 
This legislation received criticism as a stopgap 
measure at best which failed to-eliminate the reasons for 
such a calamity. Meier (1985) points out a pattern of 
legislative responses which fall far short of recognizing the 
underlying causes of the crisis in order to derive a proper 
diagnosis. The first attempts of policy makers appear to be 
designed to simply mitigate the consequences of a dilemma 
without directing significant efforts to the termination of 
Fraud and the Malfeasance of Funds 
Coincident to the increasing number of thrift failures 
came several very high profile cases of abuse within the 
system. Nominee loans, double pledging of collateral, 
reciprocal loan arrangements, land flips, embezzlement and 
check kiting were the most prolific forms of fraud according 
to the u.s. Department of Justice (Congressional Digest 
1989). Evidence of inordinate expenditures on exclusive 
parties/ nonessential aircraft and luxurious office suites 
have also arisen (Congressional Digest 1989). 
Direct allegations of fraud have been made in 
approximately half of all thrift failures (Barth 1990). The 
Attorney General places the figure for fraud and insider 
abuse closer to 25 to 30 percent of total thrift failures 
accounting for $2 billion of losses during 1988 alone 
(Congressional Digest 1989). However, evidence exists that 
despite the seemingly widespread nature of abuse, the actual 
losses inflicted by fraud are extremely low relative to the 
overall volume of losses of the system (Barth 1 Bartholomew 
and Labich 1989). 
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Despite these facts the perception of high flying thrift 
executives making speculative investments in unsubstantiated 
ventures led to a public outcry to strip thrifts of many of 
their recently acquired powers and relegate them to mortgage 
lenders as in past days. Pressure on policy makers to 
respond to such demands was tremendous and any future 
legislation dealing with depository institutions must 
certainly account for such concerns. 
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Major Changes FIRREA Instituted 
The FIRREA Act of 1989 represents the most comprehensive 
overhaul of the depository institutions industry since the 
1930s. Among other items it changed the asset and liability 
compositions of institutions, capital requirements as well as 
the insurance premiums paid to guarantee deposits. FIRREA 
revamped the regulatory structure of the industry and 
replaced the defunct FSLIC with the Savings Association 
Insurance Fund (SAIF) placing its supervision under the FDIC. 
The Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) was stripped of its 
~bartering and supervisory duties over savings and loans with 
these functions coming under the domain of the Treasury 
Department. 
The essential purpose of FIRREA was to restore the 
viability of and the public's confidence in the nation's 
thrifts by infusing them with more money and more discipline. 
By doing so the competitive positions of the participants of 
the industry were redrawn. 
A discussion of the impact of FIRREA on the thrift 
component of the industry will follow in the next section. 
The specific effects of the legislation on state-chartered 
thrifts, federally-chartered thrifts and commercial banks 
will then be examined. A general discussion of the changing 
competitive positions of the three component parts of the 
industry will complete this section. 
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Changes to Thrifts in General 
Commercial banks had always felt that thrifts had 
essential competitive advantages in at least three key areas. 
First, thrifts had investment powers such as long term 
revenue generating mortgages and business lending 
opportunities not available to commercial banks. Second, 
thrifts were allowed to maintain significantly lower capital 
standards. The capital requirements of thrifts were only 
half the amount required in the nation's banks prior to 
FIRREA. Third, thrifts had the ability to borrow at reduced 
rates from the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB). The availability 
of low cost funds gave them increased profit potential. 
The elimination, or providing homogeneous compliance or 
equal access to these would tend to decrease the competitive 
advantage of thrifts while enhancing the same for commercial 
banks. FIRREA addressed these and other issues concerning 
thrifts by proposing an eight-point agenda. First, thrifts 
were to have lower commercial real estate loan limits. 
second, they would be prohibited from direct real estate and 
equity investments. Third, new capital rules for thrifts and 
their subsidiaries were instituted. Fourth, stricter 
loan-to-value ratios were to be enforced. Fifth, regulatory 
authorities were given increased criminal enforcement powers. 
Sixth, higher deposit insurance premiums were to be paid. 
seventh, new limitations would be placed on powers granted to 
state-chartered savings and loans. Eighth, there would be 
new restrictions on brokered deposits, see cranford [1989A], 
Meyer [1990], Lange and Schiller [1989] and Chessen [1989]. 
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The retained earnings of the FHLBB would now be tapped 
to help fund the cost of the savings and loan bailout. This 
will limit the value of the thrift-owned stock in the FHLB 
reducing their dividends thus making it more difficult to 
raise capital in accordance with new requirements. These 
earnings have traditionally been a key source of low cost 
funding to thrifts. By decreasing the amount of credit 
available to them borrowing rates will rise. Many savings 
and loans may pursue a strategy of down-sizing their asset 
portfolio's in an attempt to meet higher capital standards 
thus reducing their profit potential. Already paying premium 
rates to attract deposits and now required to pay higher 
insurance premiums while doubling their capital requirement 
within two years can only further strain savings and loan 
profitability. 
A stricter Qualified Thrift Lender (QTL} Test is also 
imposed on thrifts. To insure that thrifts "stick to their 
knitting" only those institutions having at least 70 percent 
of their portfolio's in housing related fields will qualify 
for favorable tax treatment and insurance protection 
guarantees. Thus, the focus of FIRREA was to revert thrifts 
back to their more traditional lines of commerce and product 
lines of home building and finance. However, mortgages are 
only marginally profitable at best particularly during 
interest rate fluctuations, see Ordway [1989], Cooper [1989] 
and Hanc [1989]. 
State-Chartered Thrifts 
The majority of the bad press regarding the nation's 
thrifts has been leveled at the state-chartered savings and 
loans. Lax regulation allowed highfliers and newcomers to 
enter a field without proper capital or expertise. Abuse of 
power, bad loans and fraud contributed to the bankruptcy of 
the FSLIC. 
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In order to limit future exposure to the remaining 
depository insurance funds, state-chartered thrifts were 
prohibited under FIRREA from "engaging in activities not 
permissible to federally-chartered savings associations in 
type and amount" (Cranford 1989D). State-chartered thrifts 
were prohibited from the following four basic types of 
investments: 1) direct investment in real estate 
development, 2) making commercial or other non-housing loans, 
3) speculation in non-investment grade corporate debt (i.e., 
junk bonds) and 4) stock ownership. 
State-chartered institutions were to have "bank-like'' 
capital requirements, higher deposit insurance premiums and 
no longer given the opportunity to make investments forbidden 
to federally-chartered thrifts. Beyond these changes, 
state-chartered savings and loans faced severe restrictions 
on the percent of reserves which could be lent to a single 
borrower. Homebuilders had severe objections to this new 
limitation, see Allen [1989]. 
Federally-Chartered Thrifts 
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Beyond the new stricter guidelines for increased capital 
requirements and insurance premiums required of all thrifts, 
federally-chartered savings and loans would be affected in 
three primary ways. First, the amount of a thrift's loan 
portfolio that may be invested in commercial real estate is 
reduced. Second, federally-chartered institutions would not 
be forced to divest commercial real estate loans that exceed 
the limit. Finally, they would be pe~mitted to offer 
checking accounts to commercial customers without first 
establishing a "business relationship" with them, a break in 
tradition (Cranford 1989B). 
The competitive position of federally-chartered thrifts 
diminishes in comparison to commercial banks with respect to 
tougher capital and insurance premium requirements. The 
prohibition of certain assets and diminished allowance of 
others is not as severe as those mandated for state-chartered 
thrifts. 
With the abolition of practices which state-chartered 
institutions were permitted in excess of allowable limits for 
federally-chartered thrifts, one could expect that the latter 
would gain a competitive edge over their state-chartered 
counterparts. 
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Commercial Banks 
While FIRREA would extract higher deposit ,insurance 
premiums from commercial banks, it will greatly enhance their 
competitive positions in three ways. First, commercial banks 
will be granted membership in the FHLBB with favored access. 
They can have the opportunity to secure loans at favorable 
rates without meeting the stock purchase requirements of 
thrifts. This gives commercial banks a source of funds not 
previously available to them. second, commercial banks are 
now granted permission to acquire both healthy or insolvent 
thrifts effectively allowing them to branch into more 
geographical areas, new products (i.e. home mortgages), and 
gives them the ability to cross market their services. 
Finally, commercial banks will receive insurance premium 
rebates when their insurance fund reserves reach a specified 
level. It is unlikely that thrifts will ever reach their 
limits anytime soon, see cranford [1989B]. 
commercial banks are given several opportunities to 
enhance their competitive position relative to thrifts. 
Access to FHLBB funds and branch banking via thrift 
acquisition are great benefits accorded to them. 
overall Impact 
If Stigler's (1971) hypothesis is correct, then there 
would tend to be theoretical evidence to favor commercial 
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banks gaining at the primary expense of state-chartered 
savings and loans. state-chartered thrifts are now required 
to have commercial bank-like capital and pay higher insurance 
premiums. Competitive advantages they once enjoyed over 
their federally-chartered counterparts have been eliminated 
under FIRREA. Commercial banks' new opportunities to borrow 
at a reduced rate once reserved for thrifts and the ability 
to acquire thrifts thereby extending their influence at 
modest costs must be considered a potentially great benefit 
to them. 
CHAPTER III 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Introduction 
This segment of the research will present the relevant 
empirical literature to date on the use of financial theory 
to study the impact of regulation and regulatory changes upon 
the various elements of the depository institutions industry. 
A brief discussion of the Economic Theory of Regulation will 
be followed by the recent papers which shed light upon this 
theory's validity. Finally, three articles by Allen and 
Wilhelm (1988), Millon-cornett and Tehranian (1989) and 
Millon-Cornett and Tehranian (1990) are highlighted at the 
end of this discussion due to their importance for this 
research in terms of approach and methodology. 
The Economic Theory of Regulation 
Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976) theorize a market for 
regulation whose value and distribution are determined by the 
interaction of policymakers and the regulated firms. 
Regulation can convey definite benefits to an industry in a 
variety of forms, i.e. restricted entry and price fixing. 
Those firms within the industry which are effective in 
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exerting political influence may be accorded a 
disproportionate share of these benefits which may come at 
the expense of the remaining firms. 
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Posner (1974} believes that given time, regulated firms 
will obtain the political savvy necessary to retain and 
possibly enhance their positions by skillful manipulation of 
the regulatory apparatus. By doing S0 1 these regulated firms 
would in affect "capture" their regulators and work the 
process to their continual advantage. Therefore having 
established their relative positions within the regulatory 
environment, any significant alteration of regulation by 
policymakers will induce a potential redistribution of wealth 
among the market participants (Stigler 1971). The resulting 
effect of such a change may have either a positive of 
negativeimpact among the various elements comprising the 
industry, much like the original imposition of regulation 
entailed. 
Peltzman (1976) further asserts that the competitive and 
cost insulating effects of regulation will lower ownership 
risk. Any erosion of regulation which significantly 
realigns the competitive positions within an industry can 
potentially elicit a change in ownership risk. 
Empirical Studies on Depository Institutions 
Schwert (1981) justified the use of financial theory to 
analyze the impact of regulation on firm profitability. The 
Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) posits that asset prices 
reflect all available relevant information. The response of 
shareholders to any significant unanticipated information 
concerning the expected value of future cash flows will be 
immediately impounded into share prices. These changes in 
stock value provide an unbiased estimate of market 
participants reaction to regulatory change. Therefore, 
financial theory provides an advantageous vantage point from 
which to view the examination of regulatory change. 
Peltzman (1968) first employed market values to examine 
the structure-performance relationship of commercial banks. 
This article focused on the welfare aspects of a segmented 
banking system and the impact of entry upon the stock prices 
of banks. Peltzman found evidence that economies of scale 
are present within the banking system. However, by 
prohibiting meaningful inter and intra state branching, 
regulation tends to stifle these economies. The cost of 
such regulation are significant. 
Aharony and swary (1981) used the market model with an 
event study format to study the stock price impact of the 
Bank Holding Company Act of 1970. Bank holding company 
expansion into nonbank realms during the early 1970s was 
profound. Their effects on one-bank holding companies and 
multibank holding companies revealed no significant investor 
reaction to the legislation. Further, no changes in the 
relative risk of these firms were detected. 
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Binder (1985) points out that the failure of event 
studies to find detectable levels of investor reaction may 
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not necessarily rule out the ineffectiveness of the 
legislation. The problem may lie in the inexact nature of 
determining the appropriate dates when new information 
actually reached the market. Incorrect specification of event 
dates would lower the confidence of determining the precise 
interaction of regulation and market value changes. 
Chance and Lane (1980) incorporated interest rates into 
the market model in an attempt to improve its specification 
for financial institutions. They found no relationship 
between interest rate changes and stock price movements for 
the industry. However, Flannery and James (1984) found 
evidence that the stock prices of financial institutions were 
effected by interest rate fluctuations. The extent of the 
influence is positively related to the magnitude of the 
maturity difference between the institution's assets and 
liabilities. This result was valid for both long and 
short-term measures of interest rates. They conclude that 
the longer the maturity of assets and the shorter the 
duration of liabilities the greater is the impact of 
inflation lessening the market value of the institution. 
Deposit rate regulation acts as a subsidy by 
guaranteeing a constant cost of acquiring funds. This 
represents a transfer of wealth from depositors to 
stockholders. Dann and James (1982) believe that in an 
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efficient market this advantage should be fully capitalized 
into the stock prices of thrifts. They study the impact of 
the market value of thrifts when rate ceilings on small saver 
certificates below $100,000 were abolished. Their results 
showed a negative investor reaction to publicly traded 
thrifts upon the announcement of removal of interest rate 
ceilings. James (1983) did find evidence that market values 
of commercial banks were significantly enhanced upon the 
elimination of interest rate ceilings on certificates of 
deposits in excess of $100,000. However no perceived 
investor response was detected for the abolition of ceilings 
on the consumer oriented MMCs of smaller denominations. 
James also discovered intraindustry regulatory effects on 
commercial banks. Wholesale banks experienced positive 
excess returns on information of ceiling removals while 
retail banks had the opposite reaction. 
Smirlock (1984) extends the analysis of bank deposit 
rate regulatory changes to the relative risk component of 
banks. He failed to find proof that the lifting of interest 
rate ceilings leads to a corresponding increase in bank risk. 
Therefore, banks do not automatically acquire incentives to 
delve into riskier assets upon the elimination of deposit 
rate ceilings. Smirlock concludes that the solvency of banks 
should not be threatened by such occurrences. This study 
also concludes that rate regulation causes wealth transfers 
from large to small banks and from depositors to 
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shareholders. 
Santoni (1985) evaluated the impact of the homogeneous 
reserve requirements of DIDMCA on the stock prices of 40 bank 
holding companies. Arguing that these reserve requirements 
behave as a tax, he found that Federal Reserve member banks, 
whose requirements were lowered, garnered increased stock 
values. In contrast, nonmember bank holding companies 
experienced the opposite as their reserve requirements were 
raised. 
Allen and Wilhelm (1988) 
Allen and Wilhelm (1988) studied the market's reaction to 
the events leading to the passage of DIDMCA in 1980. Using 
weekly return data, they segmented depository institutions 
into three equally weighted portfolios: 1) 38 Federal Reserve 
member banks, 2) 16 nonmember banks and 3) 19 stock savings 
and loans. Intervention analysis which specifically captures 
alterations in the stochastic return generating process was 
used in the framework of the market model. Not only would 
this technique accurately reflect the market participants 
expectations of the act but also the impact of the 
legislation on the risk characteristics of these 
institutions. Peltzman (1976) hypothesizes that the erosion 
of regulation will lead to greater risk of ownership. 
Allen and Wilhelm selected six event weeks containing 
relevant news of the progress of DIDMCA through the 
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legislative process. They found the only unanticipated 
information about the act to reach investors came during the 
week of enactment. They theorize that up until the act was 
passed that its final form and therefore ultimate influence 
on the various sectors of the industry remained essentially 
unknown. Federal Reserve member banks experienced 
significant positive returns of 3.9 percent while nonmember 
banks and savings and loans had losses of 4 .. 3 percent and 4.4 
percent respectfully for this week. Joint tests of 
hypothesis revealed that Federal Reserve member banks 
benefited from this legislation to the detriment of savings 
and loans as well as nonmember banks. They saw this to be 
evidence in support of Stigler's (1971) regulatory hypothesis 
of a redistribution of wealth as regulation is imposed or 
altered. There were no results generated which would suggest 
Peltzman's (1976) alteration of the risk structure. 
Millon-cornett and Tehranian (1989) 
Investor reactions to the chronology of events which led 
to the adoption of DIDMCA were also approached by 
Millon-Cornett and Tehranian (1989). Equally weighted 
portfolios of 1) 42 large banks, 2) 158 small banks, 3) 12 
large savings and loans, and 4) 16 small savings and loans were 
collected. Zellner's (1962) and Thiel's (1971) Seemingly 
unrelated Regressions (SUR) technique was employed to estimate 
the market model incorporating dummy variables to account for 
43 
the nine event dates when significant new information may have 
reached the market concerning the nature of the legislation or 
its probability of adoption. 
Millon-cornett and Tehranian found several announcements 
to elicit favorable responses of large bank investors, i.e. the 
initial proposal of the legislation and its final approval by 
the House of Representatives. These events resulted in 
negative abnormal returns for small commercial banks and small 
thrifts. The inclusion of an announcement detrimental to 
passage produced the exact opposite results. There was no 
detection of abnormal returns for large S&Ls. 
Millon-cornett and Tehranian believe large commercial 
banks to inherit the greatest benefits of deregulation. 
Removal of Regulation Q and enhanced activity opportunities 
allowed them to compete more affectively with nonbank banks 
as well as thrifts. This new competition with S&Ls which 
DIDMCA spawned is believed responsible for the absence of 
abnormal returns for large S&Ls for each of the events. 
Advantages DIDMCA rendered to these institutions vanished in 
the eyes of investors with the introduction of competition 
from banks for borrowed funds. The effect on large S&Ls is 
therefore indeterminate. The benefits of less efficient 
smaller S&Ls and banks are completely overwhelmed by the 
increased competition for funds. This increased specter of 
small institution failures led investors to view them as poor 
investments. 
Millon-cornett and Tehranian (1990) 
Millon-cornett and Tehranian (1990) used a Multivariate 
Regression Model (MVRM) to analyze the response of publicly 
traded depository institutions to the Garn-st. Germain Act. 
The industry was partitioned into four equally weighted 
portfolios according to size and type: 1) 12 large thrifts, 
2) 16 small thrifts~ 3) 42 large commercial banks and 4) 158 
small commercial banks. Dummy variables were employed to 
capture the abnormal returns associated with each of 14 
critical announcement dates leading to the passage of the 
legislation. Dates which contained information leading to 
the increased or decreased probability of adoption were 
included. 
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They reported evidence that significant abnormal returns 
existed among their chosen announcement dates and the 
reactions of investors for each portfolio were not uniform. 
Two dates conveyed significant positive abnormal returns for 
large S&Ls and large commercial banks. The recommendation of 
President Reagan's Housing Commission to enhance the 
competitive powers for thrifts produced positive abnormal 
returns of 3.93 percent and 1.21 percent for large S&Ls and 
large banks respectively. Conversely, small S&Ls and small 
banks suffered losses of 4.63 and 4.02 percents respectively. 
The Senate's approval of the bill generated positive abnormal 
returns once again for large S&Ls and large commercial banks 
of 4.93 and 2.75 percents respectively. small S&Ls and small 
commercial banks incurred losses on this date of 3.81 and 
3.48 percent, respectively. Interestingly, a date on which 
the bill faltered in the Senate produced the opposite 
results. Large S&Ls and large banks experienced losses of 
2.94 and 1.93 percent, respectively, while small S&Ls and 
small banks gained 4.90 and 1.96 percent on that date, 
respectively. 
Millon-cornett and Tehranian conclude that investors in 
large S&Ls and large banks responded favorably to the 
legislation while small S&Ls and small bank investors would 
appear to suffer. They attribute their findings to the 
response of these four groups to the increased competition 
for funds which Garn-st. Germain would create. 
Millon-cornett and Tehranian believe larger institutions to 
be more efficient and lower cost producers of financial 
services than their smaller counterparts. Given the 
increased cost of acquiring funds which the act would entail 
due to competitive bidding for funds in the money market, 
large institutions would have a better opportunity for 
survival. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Data 
The sample data analyzed in this research consists of 
daily stock returns for commercial banks and savings and 
loans trading on the New York Stock Exchange, American Stock 
Exchange and the over-the-counter Market. To be included, 
each institution was required to have return data between 
January 1, 1988 and December 31, 1989. This period spans the 
time approximately thirteen months before the legislation was 
first proposed to four months after its final enactment. The 
return data were collected from the center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) data tapes. 
A primary concern with the data collection was to obtain 
a consistent source of information listing the publicly 
traded depository institutions by type. The standard and 
Poor's Register of Corporations, Directors and Executives of 
1990 was used to identify institutions by their primary 
standard Industrial Classification Codes (SIC Codes). The 
detailed profile's of institutions within the Register were 
also consulted to insure their primary line of commerce 
satisfied the requirements of depository institutions. The 
NYSE/AMEX institution data were obtained from the CRSP tapes 
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at osu while the same information on the NASDAQ tapes was 
obtained by the generosity of the University of Arkansas. 
stock market indexes were collected from Standard and Poor's 
Stock Price Index for 1990 and from the subscription service 
of the Wilshire 5000 company. 
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The identification of relevant dates when unanticipated 
information altered either 1) the timing and probability of 
enactment or 2) the specific nature of the law's codicils due 
to the legislative process is necessary to determine the 
legislation's impact on depository institutions. The 
empirical analysis to follow is based on the proper 
identification of these dates when new information was 
conveyed to the market. Important legislative dates of 
testimony and key votes at various stages in the deliberation 
process have been identified using the Congressional Record. 
This produced the preliminary list of event dates reported in 
Table I. The Wall Street Journal Index was examined for news 
items relating the importance of the events to the various 
depository institutions. Industry journals published by the 
American Banker's Association and the u.s. League of Savings 
Institutions were also be consulted for the industry's 
interpretation of each event. 
Given the nature of the health of depository 
institutions during this most volatile period, the Wall 
street Journal Index was further reviewed to establish if any 
institutions within the sample experienced firm-specific 
events (i.e. acquisitions, litigation, unexpected earnings 
Date 
2/06/89 
4/19/89 
6/15/89 
7/27/89 
8/03/89 
8/04/89 
8/09/89 
TABLE I 
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS LEADING TO THE 
PASSAGE OF FIRREA 
Announcement 
K1 Administration proposal of FIRREA 
K2 Senate approves plan 
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K3 Admendment relaxing capital standards 
is defeated. Defeat for thrifts 
K4 House-senate conference committee 
complete work on bill 
K5 Bush veto threat if bill is financed 
on-budget 
K6 House and Senate accept revised 
conference report which placed $20B 
on budget in 1989 yet excused from 
Gramm-Rudman 
K7 Bush signs FIRREA into law 
announcements, etc.) at the time of each event. In order to 
properly isolate the impact of regulatory change on a firm's 
conduct, any firm having these confounding events was 
eliminated from consideration. 
Empirical Methodology 
The impact of FIRREA on the performance and risk of the 
various forms of depository institutions is examined using 
the market model (Fama 1976). The market model posits that 
the return of a security is primarily a function of the 
proper compensation for nondiversifiable risk, i.e. 
systematic risk. Estimation of single security returns may 
lead to erroneous test of hypothesis results due to 
contemporaneous correlation of residuals resulting from 
industry wide phenomena. Schwert (1981) suggests grouping 
firms into equally weighted portfolio's constructed along 
demographic lines. Therefore, three portfolio's of equally 
weighted regulatory status are utilized. 
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Since the nature of FIRREA was designed at least in part 
to alter the risk of depository institutions, intervention 
analysis is employed to discern the market's reaction to the 
events leading to its passage (Box and Tiao 1975), (Wichern 
and Jones 1977}. Larcker, Gordon and Pinches {1980) offer 
evidence that this technique is valid when the probability of 
the event changing the securities stochastic 
return-generating process is nonzero. 
The model produces the following system of portfolio 
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return equations for 1) 194 commercial banks, 2) 32 
state-chartered thrifts and 3) 62 federally-chartered 
thrifts: 
n 
' ' 
+ L 0ik1k Ret = <X + <X D + 13cpRmt + 13ct0sRmt + ect cp cp s 
k=1 
n 
' ' 
+ L 0 ik1k Rst = <X + <X D + f3spRmt + 13st0 sRmt + est ( 1) sp sp s 
k=1 
n 
' 
+ L 0 ik1k Rft = <Xfp + o:ft0 s + 13fpRmt + 13ft0sRmt + eft 
k=1 
where: 
Rjt=The rate of return on portfolio j on day t j = c, s, f 
Rmt=The return of the CRSP equally weighted index of all 
stocks on day t 
o:jp=The regression intercept for portfolio j before the 
intervention 
o:jp=Shift in the regression intercept due to the 
intervention 
f3jp=Cov(Rjt'Rmt)/ Var(Rmt) The systematic risk 
coefficient of portfolio j before the intervention 
f3jp=Shift in the systematic risk coefficient due to the 
intervention 
Ds=Shift dummy variable, = o Before the intervention 
= 1 After the intervention 
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Dik= Event dummy variable k 
= 1 during the period of the kth announcement 
=0 otherwise 
lk=Coefficient on event dummy variable k 
(The effect of the kth regulatory change on the jth 
portfolio) 
n = Number of days in which information concerning the 
event in question is released to the market 
£jt= Stochastic error term for portfolio j 
Changes in the regulatory environment may lead to random 
effects common to all firms within an industry. The 
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) framework can be used to 
allow for just such an occurrence, see Theil (1976) and 
Binder (1985). 
Using the SUR format, the regulatory portfolio return 
equations of (1) can be expressed as: 
Rc XC 0 0 ~c ec 
= 0 xs ~s + ( 2 ) R 0 es s 
Rf 0 0 xf ~f ef 
( 3 ) 
where: 
Rf) is a 1 X T vector of portfolio returns 
X= (1, Ds , Rm 1 DsRm I Di) is aT X N matrix of 
independent variables 
~. = (a J p a p ~P , ~P , lp) is a N X 1 vector of 
coefficients 
ef) is a 1 X T vector of disturbances 
The multivariate regression model expressed in equation 
(2) assumes that the disturbances are independent and 
identically distributed within each equation. However, 
contemporaneous correlation across equations could create 
heteroscedasticity and cannot be ignored. Equation (2) will 
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be estimated using generalized least squares (GLS) techniques 
which is more efficient than single equation ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimation with these circumstances. 
The principal advantage of multivariate regression 
methodology is the possibility of joint hypothesis testing 
when heteroscedasticity across equations and contemporaneous 
correlation of disturbances are accounted for in the 
hypothesis testing procedure. The dummy variables in the 
intervention analysis technique reflect 1) any potential 
parameter changes in the return generating process resulting 
from the announcement of new information and 2) the market's 
appraisal of new information announced. 
Designation of the time when a significant alteration in 
the return generating process occurred must be stipulated. 
Owing to the uncertainty of the final specific form of the 
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legislation, particularly the closed door debates of the 
congressional Conferee's, the most likely candidate is the 
day of enactment. This will be the proposed point of 
intervention. The impact of which will be measured by the 
, , 
statistical significance of the shift parameters ajpand ~jp" 
CHAPTER V 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This chapter presents the principal empirical results of 
the analysis. The validity of employing the SUR framework is 
discussed, followed by the estimation of the model parameters 
and their relevant test statistics. The evaluation of the 
various hypotheses is also included. 
Test for Contemporaneous correlation 
As previously mentioned, the SUR technique provides an 
advantageous vehicle over single OLS estimation for the joint 
testing of hypotheses. For this method to offer such 
enhanced efficiency, contemporaneous correlation must be 
present. Breusch and Pagan (1980) suggest a Lagrange 
multiplier statistic as the appropriate criterion for 
detecting the presence of contemporaneous correlation. For 
the three equation model in this analysis the statistic is 
given by: 
with: T = the number of observations (504 for this model) 
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r = 
1\ 21\ 2 
0' 0' 
i i j j 
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This A statistic is distributed as x2 with three degrees 
of freedom (Judge et al 1990). The appropriate correlations 
are provided by the cross model correlation matrix of the SUR 
procedure of Proc Syslin in the statistical Analysis System 
(SAS) package. The calculated value of A is 543.816. The 
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critical value of a X (3) at the 5 percent level is 7.81. 
Therefore the null hypothesis of the absence of 
contemporaneous correlation is rejected. 
Panel A of Table II presents the SUR estimates of the 
abnormal returns and the t-statistics for each of the seven 
announcements across each of the portfolio's of 66 
state-chartered thrifts, 98 federally-chartered thrifts and 
164 commercial banks. The coefficients of determination, 
first-order autocorrelation coefficients and the 
Durbin-Watson statistics of each portfolio are also reported. 
Panel B of Table II presents the F-Statistics for Hypothesis 
2 which measures the significance of the abnormal returns for 
each announcement. 
Hypotheses Tested 
The abnormal returns associated with the various k 
announcements which cannot be explained by the stochastic 
return generating process are the ~·sin equation (1). The 
TABLE II 
RESULTS OF INTERVENTION ANALYSIS OF THREE EQUALLY-WEIGHTED 
REGULATORY PORTFOLIO'S AND DUMMY VARIABLES 
SURROUNDING THE PASSAGE 
OF FIRREA 
Panel A 
Parameters Portfolio Estimates 
RST RFT RCB 
Constant -0.00007 0.0004 0.0005 
(-0.260) (1.68) (3.805) 
Post-FIRREA -0.0026 
* 
-0.0018 * -0.001 
* constant (-4.191) (-3.230) (-3.796) 
Beta 0.6967 
* 
0.5349 
* 
0.5248 
* (13.978) (12.036) (22.680) 
Post-FIRREA 0.2444 * 0.0711 0.1543 * 
Beta (2.307) (0.753) (3.136) 
K1 -0.0012 -0.0007 0.0011 
(-0.363) (-0.233) (0.746) 
K2 0.0028 -0.0013 -0.0002 
(0.884) (-0.472) (-0.137) 
K3 -0.0018 -0.0011 0.0008 
(-0.574) (-0.394) (0.523) 
K,. -0.0014 -0.0010 0.0012 
(-0.446) (-0.343) (0.776) 
Ks -0.0050 -0.0035 0.0015 
(-1.178) (-0.929) (0.753) 
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TABLE II (CONTINUED) 
K6 0.0044 0.0042 -0.00008 
(1.039) (1.109) (0.394) 
K7 0.0074 0.0133 0.0041 
* * * (2.323) (4.665) (2.784) 
Adjusted R2 .40 .32 .62 
p 
-.004 -.199 -.001 
Durbin-watson 1.943 2.397 2.001 
statistic 
Panel B 
Event F-statistics for Hypothesis 2 
Kt 0.4011 
K2 0.5104 
K3 0.3920 
K4 0.4998 
Ks 1.3334 
K6 0.9952 
* K7 7.7778 
* Significant at the 5% level 
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significance of these l's across portfolio's and 
announcements (k) is the focus of the first three hypotheses 
evaluated. 
Hypothesis 1: The events leading to the passage of 
FIRREA never generated significant 
abnormal returns. 
This is the test of abnormal returns jointly equaling 
zero for all announcements over all portfolio's and is given 
as the null hypothesis: 
H : 
0 = 0 v j 'k 
The critical value of the F-statistic as defined by 
Theil (1971) is 1.57. The calculated value of the test 
statistic incorporating these restrictions is 
F(21,1482)=1.581 which is significant at the 5 percent 
level. Thus the null hypothesis is rejected as evidence is 
provided that abnormal returns do indeed exist among the 
various announcement dates. 
Hypothesis 2: The individual announcements (k) of any 
new information had no impact across 
portfolios 
This is a test of abnormal returns for each portfolio 
equaling zero on any announcement day and is expressed by the 
null hypothesis: 
H . 
o' = 0 v j 
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The t-statistics from Table II of each announcement on 
each portfolio reveal that only the enactment date (K7 ) 
provided significant abnormal returns at the 5 percent level. 
The excess returns for state-chartered thrifts, 
federally-chartered thrifts and commercial banks were .7 
percent, 1.3 percent and .4 percent respectively. The 
calculated F-statistic to determine the significance of each 
announcement across portfolios is reported in row 5 of Table 
II. Only for the date of enactment (K7 ) did this statistic 
prove significant. 
Hypothesis 3: Stigler's (1971) assertion that 
regulatory changes will result in 
disproportionate wealth redistributions. 
This is a joint test that the impact of FIRREA is the 
same for each regulatory portfolio and is given by the 
following null hypothesis: 
H . 
o· = 0 v i,j 
This is a test of linear restrictions on ~ of equation 
(1) of the following form: 
L~ = 1 
where Lis a P X N matrix of constants with rank P(P ~ K), ~is 
anN X 1 vector of coefficients estimated from (2), 1 is a P X 
1 vector of constants, P is the number of restrictions tested, 
see Cornett and Tehanrian (1989). 
According to Theil (1971) the joint test statistic is: 
JT- JN (1- L/3) I { L [X' (L -t ® I)X] - 1 L'} - 1 (1- L/3) 
p 
where: 
I = (J. • J.,J i,j = c,s,f 
® = the Kronecker Product 
T = the number of daily returns (=504) 
J =the number of portfolio's tested 
P = the number of restrictions tested 
which is asymptotically distributed as F(P, JT- JN), see 
Cornett and Tehanrian (1989), Wilhelm and Allen (1988). The 
critical value of the test is F(1,1503,.05) ~ 3.84. Joint 
tests of the hypotheses: 
H0 : lchK? - lstK? = 0 (Commercial Banks vs 
state-chartered thrifts) 
H0 : lcbK? - ~'rtK? = 0 (Commercial Banks vs 
Federally-chartered thrifts) 
H • 
o' lrtK? - ~'stK? = 0 (Federally-chartered vs 
State-chartered thrifts) 
yield the test statistics: 
F = 1.23 
F = 11.64 
F = 2.81 
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These tests suggest that the impact of FIRREA on the 
returns of federally-chartered and state-chartered thrifts 
were essentially identical. However the passage of FIRREA 
resulted in significantly different returns among commercial 
banks and federally-chartered thrifts which implies that 
wealth was rearranged in a dissimilar manner. 
Federally-chartered thrifts gained more than commercial 
banks. 
The Impact of FIRREA on Risk 
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Peltzman (1976) hypothesized that alterations of 
regulatory structures will lead to changes in ownership risk. 
Any significant change in the underlying stochastic return 
generating process will be revealed by the coefficients of a' 
and~~ in equation (1). 
As Table II reports, the constant in the post-FIRREA era 
is significantly lower for all three portfolios at the 5 
percent level. The measure of risk, ~, is significantly 
higher for both state-chartered thrifts and commercial banks 
at the 5 percent level. However, the risk component for 
federally-chartered thrifts showed no substantial change. 
Thus the increased ownership risk of regulatory change as 
espoused by Peltzman (1976) seems evident for both 
state-chartered thrifts and commercial banks. 
CHAPTER VI 
INTERPRETATION, CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter offers the interpretation of the 
empirical results. An examination of the parameter estimates 
and their significance provides the evidence of FIRREA's 
impact upon the various components of the depository 
institutions industry. Next conclusions are drawn as to 
the effect of FIRREA on the future structure-performance 
relationship within the industry. Finally, extensions of 
this analysis are presented for further consideration. 
Possible research in close proximity to this study is also 
be examined. 
Interpretation of the Results 
The interpretation of results focuses upon three key 
areas for which investors demonstrated significant reaction: 
1) changes in the overall expected return for investments 
made in the industry, 2) changes in the measure of market 
risk perceived by market participants, and 3) specific 
reactions of investors to the events leading to the passage 
of FIRREA. 
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Alpha Shifts 
The first area of investigation concerns the significant 
shifts in the constant term, (a), of the market model. By 
the nature of its construct, a significant decrease in the 
constant term would reveal pessimistic investor reaction to 
future profitability of institutions as a result of the 
enactment of FIRREA. Statistically significant negative 
shifts were indeed detected in the constant of all three 
portfolios with the a' parameter estimates for 
state-chartered thrifts, federally-chartered thrifts and 
commercial banks of -0.0026 (t= -4.191), -0.0018 (t= -3.230) 
and -0.0026 (t= -3.796) respectively. 
Such widespread feeling by investors could be explained 
by several factors. FIRREA would add directly to the 
operational costs of depository institutions by imposing 
increased deposit insurance rate premiums. Prior to FIRREA, 
thrifts paid the FSLIC 20.8 cents per $100 of depos~ts. The 
new law requires them to pay 23 cents by January 1, 1991. 
This will put added stress on marginally solvent thrifts 
attempting to comply with the higher capital requirements 
established by FIRREA. commercial banks had previously been 
assessed 8.3 cents per $100 of deposits but this figure would 
rise to 15 cents by 1991 (Cox 1989). Profits for commercial 
banks with $100 million in deposits would fall by $67,000 to 
cover the increased insurance rates. 
The increased capital requirements of FIRREA will lower 
the amount of funds available for earning assets, thus 
lowering profitability. This has led elements of the thrift 
component to downsize their operations. By decreasing their 
volume of assets they can comply with the tougher capital to 
asset standards without directly increasing capital (Cargill 
1991). However, this action will also have a detrimental 
effect on their profitability. 
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The more stringent QTL Test forces thrifts to engage a 
higher percentage of loans in home mortgages which are only 
marginally profitable at best (Roosevelt 1990). Recessionary 
tendencies of the economy also led investors to question the 
asset quality of all types of institutions. The diversion of 
FHLB system_income to assist the cost of the bailout will 
decrease the dividends paid to member thrifts further eroding 
profitability. By the first quarter of 1990 the dividend had 
been cut to 8.3 percent from 13 percent in 1989 (Roosevelt 1990). 
Beta Shifts 
The second area of interest is the possible alteration 
in the systematic risk of depository institutions as 
perceived by investors. A significant increase in the beta 
coefficient in the post-FIRREA era would lend credence to the 
Peltzman (1976) hypothesis of an increase in ownership risk 
resulting from a change in the regulatory environment. 
Table II's row 4 presents the post-FIRREA beta 
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coefficients for the three portfolios. State-chartered 
thrifts experienced a significant increase in risk with a 
reported post-FIRREA beta estimate of 0.2444 (t= 2.307). 
Several factors may have contributed to such an increase in 
systematic risk. State-chartered thrifts were now subject to 
stricter regulation of activities. FIRREA eliminated many 
high yielding assets such as direct real estate investments 
which could provide an efficient inflationary hedge against 
rising interest rates. state-chartered thrifts were not as 
well capitalized as their federally-chartered counterparts 
which would lower their probability of meeting the higher 
capi~al standards. As a group, they were not as close to the 
new 70 percent mortgage requirement of the QTL Test as federal 
thrifts. 
The post-FIRREA beta coefficient for federally-chartered 
thrifts was 0.0711 (t= 0.753). These institutions showed no 
significant change in the systematic risk component of the 
return generating process. On the whole, they were a better 
capitalized lot, capable of meeting the increased capital 
requirements of FIRREA with less difficulty than 
state-chartered thrifts. The majority of federal thrift 
institutions could also comply with the stricter QTL Test. 
Investors did not perceive FIRREA increasing the risk of 
investments in publicly traded federally-chartered thrifts. 
Commercial banks witnessed a significant increase in 
their post-FIRREA beta coefficient of 0.1543 (t= 3.136). 
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During this era, bank stocks were in an economic bind. 
Favorable economic news inevitably renders higher interest 
rates that drive up costs and lower stock values while 
recessionary trends lead to concerns about deteriorating 
asset quality. Investors were also expressing concerns over 
distressed asset qualities of some banks. Tardy repayment 
and defaults of third-world country loans led to enhanced 
risk in their loan portfolio's (Forde 1989}. overcapacity in 
the depressed real estate markets of the Northeast left banks 
with mounting loan losses (Forde 1989). 
Reactions to FIRREA's Passage 
Despite the general public's conception, the majority of 
thrifts remained healthy, by capital standards, during the 
1980s. Barth (1991) points out that the bulk of thrifts 
retained adequate solvency to meet the tangible-to-asset 
ratios required by FIRREA. An examination of the 
institutions employed in this research affirms that 
approximately two-thirds of all thrifts reacted favorably to 
the enactment date of this legislation. 
Investors of healthy thrifts would be encouraged for 
several reasons. First the perception and stigma of 
continuing insolvency difficulties and failures with troubled 
institutions lead depositors to shy away from the entire 
industry regardless of the soundness of a particular 
institution. such withdrawals would prove to inflict further 
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damage to healthy thrifts. secondly, unhealthy thrifts in a 
desperate attempt to retain liquidity were prone to increase 
deposit rates to attract funds thus increasing costs to 
healthy thrifts. Steps taken by FIRREA to phase out the 
unhealthy element of thrifts were viewed by investors of 
state-chartered and federally-chartered thrifts as a positive 
move. Also healthy thrifts could now be bought by commercial 
banks making investments in such institutions more palatable. 
As a result, both federally-chartered and state-chartered 
thrifts experienced significant positive abnormal returns of 
1.33 percent (t= 4.665) and .74 percent (t= 2.323) 
respectively. 
Commercial banks were accorded several new opportunities 
under FIRREA which could prove advantageous. First, 
commercial banks were given the privilege of borrowing from 
the FHLB system. While this would provide an added source of 
funds to meet liquidity needs, analysts reasoned that healthy 
banks would be hesitant to pursue such activity since it 
could possibly convey substantial liquidity difficulties 
(Cline 1989). This public image could hasten the withdrawal 
of funds from such institutions. Secondly banks were given 
the chance to acquire both healthy and insolvent thrift 
institutions. Their motivation would come from three 
sources: 1) the expansion of their retail presence and 
deposit-gathering base, 2) effective branching to any part of 
the country of their choice, and 3) the elimination of thrift 
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competition for funds and deposit rates (Trigaux 1989). 
However, the acquisitions of thrifts would be tempered by the 
proper assessment of thrift value due to antiquated 
accounting procedures thus slowing the process. The use of 
book value versus the true market value of assets makes such 
an evaluation adds an element of risk to the purchaser. Both 
of these privileges would initially have only limited 
practical effects. As a result, commercial banks experienced 
a significant positive abnormal return on the enactment date 
of .41 percent (t= 2.784). In sum, banks benefited from 
FIRREA but these pluses were partly mitigated by practical 
reality. 
Conclusions 
The depository institutions industry, particularly 
thrifts, entered the mid-1970s with non-diversified 
portfolios of assets and liabilities with mismatched maturity 
structures and mispriced deposit insurance. Restrictive 
legislation of the 1930s had effectively quelled competition 
for both sources and uses of funds as well as rates paid and 
charged. The industry was ill-prepared for the rapid 
adaptation required by the new financial environment and 
failed to meet the competitive challenges of new products and 
competitors in an escalating inflationary and interest rate 
climate. Deregulation of the early 1980s allowed 
institutions to pursue new avenues for survival. However 
recession took its toll on asset quality and insolvencies 
mounted. The public image of the industry was at a new low 
and demands for reform resulted in the passage of FIRREA. 
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FIRREA was primarily designed to address the 
difficulties of thrifts by increasing both deposit insurance 
premiums and capital requirements while disposing the assets 
of insolvent institutions. However, properly priced deposit 
insurance premiums based upon the risk of an institution's 
asset portfolio would have to await another day. Regulatory 
forbearance of capital requirements was granted to 
institutions whose difficulties were the result of economic 
distress. Activity restrictions would be phased in over the 
ensuing years. Resolution of insolvent thrifts was viewed as 
a victory for healthy thrifts albeit temporary. The slow 
process of the dispensation of insolvent thrift assets would 
add greatly to the cost of the bailout. Increased personal 
liability penalties for failed thrift activities may lead to 
a very conservative approach by managers. Avoidance of 
increased levels of risk may force them into lower yielding 
endeavors thereby decreasing profitability. 
The net result of this analysis reveals lower 
profitability for the industry as a result of FIRREA. Barth 
(1991) estimates the annualized rate of return on tangible 
capital for healthy thrifts to be 10.7 percent which he deems 
too low to insure their long term stability. Evidence of 
this assertion was provided by this research with the 
significant reductions of the portfolio alpha's. 
"FIRREA also influenced the risk of investments in 
state-chartered thrifts. Prohibited from engaging in 
high-yielding ventures led investors to question their 
ability to survive as a separate entity. Significant 
interest rate risk remains for all thrifts as variable rate 
loans designed to reduce such risk are limited by caps to 
protect the borrowing public (Roosevelt 1989). 
Commercial bank risk increased during this era but 
probably because of non-FIRREA related issues. Increased 
exposure to third-world debt and the real estate calamity of 
the Northeast were the most likely candidates producing such 
results (Forde 1989). 
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No direct evidence of stigler's (1971) hypothesis of 
redistribution of wealth among winners and losers as a result 
of regulatory change was found. However, to the extent that 
FIRREA was designed to help the industry, evidence was 
uncovered that increases in wealth were distributed in a 
non-homogeneous manner. 
The depository institutions industry is currently 
undergoing a consolation trend. The number of independent 
thrifts had been curtailed to 2,949 by 1988 from 3,993 in 
1980 due to acquisition, merger or dissolution (Barth 1991). 
Increased concentration can be expected as excess capital of 
healthy banks is used to eventually purchase thrifts over 
time. The nature of the industry is also changing. Thrifts 
have also lost substantial amounts of market share to 
commercial banks and nonbank banks. Banks account for 
one-fourth of all mortgage loans now being originated 
(Klinkerman and Zuckerman 1990). 
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Substantial difficulties still appear to lie ahead for 
both the industry and the taxpaying public. Barth (1991) 
believes that many of the original ingredients of the thrift 
disaster of the 1980s still exist. The primary failure of 
policymakers to recognize that rigidities imposed on the 
system prevent the proper evolution of the industry and thus 
jeopardize its probability for survival. Institutions remain 
undercapitalized with mispriced deposit insurance. They 
still have interest rate risk and have maturity structures 
which are out of balance in terms of duration and return. 
Carron (1985) points out the continual failure of authorities 
to understand the causes of this dilemma and thereby take the 
necessary actions to eliminate the chance of such a 
recurrence. 
Recommendations 
This analysis lends itself to several logical extensions 
for future research. A delineation of healthy and unhealthy 
institutions could better afford an evaluation of the merits 
of this legislation on the various segments of the industry. 
As previously mentioned the reaction of these elements would 
differ to such a regulatory change. One possible criterion 
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would be to use industry trade journals which list those 
institutions capable of meeting the higher capital standards 
before FIRREA's enactment versus those which failed to do so. 
The effect of bank acquisitions of thrifts on the 
competitive positions of surviving institutions also remains 
an open question. The consolidation of the industry 
currently taking place could lead to more oligopolistic 
pricing behavior in certain locales. 
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